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Abstract—In recent years, privacy issues in the networking field 
are getting more important. In particular, there is a lively debate 
about how Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should collect and 
treat data coming from passive network measurements. This kind 
of information, such as flow records or HTTP logs, carries 
considerable knowledge from several points of view: traffic 
engineering, academic research, and web marketing can take 
advantage from passive network measurements on ISP customers. 
Nevertheless, in many cases collected measurements contain 
personal and confidential information about customers exposed to 
monitoring, thus raising several ethical issues. Modern web is very 
different from the one we experienced few years ago: web services 
converged to few protocols (i.e., HTTP and HTTPS) and a large 
share of traffic is encrypted. 
The aim of this work is to provide an insight about which 
information is still visible to ISPs, with particular attention to novel 
and emerging protocols, and to what extent it carries personal 
information. We illustrate that sensible information, such as 
website history, is still exposed to passive monitoring. We illustrate 
privacy and ethical issues deriving by the current situation and 
provide general guidelines and best practices to cope with the 
collection of network traffic measurements. 
Keywords—Passive Monitoring, Privacy, ISP 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
Passive measurements are the most practical means to 
measure the behavior of network users. They provide 
immediate and detailed insights about the usage of the 
network at the physical layer; furthermore, when suitable 
processing is performed on collected data, it is possible to 
extract higher level metrics to measure, e.g., users’ perceived 
Quality of Experience (QoE) [1], video streaming quality, 
etc. The collected data contains knowledge about the users 
and services that they are using. Thus, it possibly exposes 
private information or user’s credentials. Privacy and 
security issues are strongly related to the adopted protocols, 
if they are encrypted or they transmit users credentials as 
clear text, etc. Several ethical issues arise when ISP and 
network administrators cope with passive measurements, 
and it is not often clear to what extent user’s privacy is 
broken e.g., i) which kind of data is visible by network 
probes, ii) what can be extracted from the user’s flow 
records, iii) how should the extracted data be stored, iv) who 
has the right to access the collected data, etc. Many works 
investigate about the ethical arguments in the modern web; 
in particular Zevenbergen et al. [2] and Vassio et al. [3] 
discuss the ethical issues related to traffic measurement, and 
provide guidelines on how to deal with personal data. 
To illustrate the considered scenario, Fig. 1 shows a 
typical use case of network passive monitoring. A probe 
seats at ISP level, e.g., a Point of Presence (PoP) where 
households’ traffic is aggregated. All users’ connections 
behind the probe can be possibly captured and analyzed by 
the probe. Moreover, nowadays probes are able to filter 
connections or packets with protocol-based and content-
based filtering rules. The fundamental questions are: i) which 
information is visible at the ISP level, ii) how much 
information can be captured or stored at the probes. The 
storage security and accessibility of the collected data are out 
of scope of this work since several generic and well-known 
techniques exist. However, we deal with possible ethical and 
privacy issues about extracted data from users. 
A passive probe captures and analyzes traffic, grabbing (or 
sniffing) packets transmitted on network cable(s). Each 
packet is composed by several protocol headers and a 
payload. The headers contain useful information such IP 
addresses and ports of the two communication endpoints. 
Typically, network packets are aggregated into flows (TCP 
or UDP connections) by grouping them by IP address and 
port number. All packets belonging to the same flow are 
analyzed together to compute overall statistics; the set of 
techniques to study network flows is called flow monitoring 
[4]. Each flow record includes fine grained information 
about the flow start time, duration, and byte transfer by 
endpoints. ISPs have personal information about all 
individual customers from the moment they apply for the 
service and, furthermore, they are responsible for managing 
and assigning IP addresses. Thus, it is trivial for IPSs to 
associate traffic to the single customer by simply looking up 
the client IP address of flows. Beside the customer identifier, 
passive measurements give information about the contacted 
services, at which time and with which order they are 
contacted. The server IP address provides information about 
the server location and, possibly, about the services provided 
by it. That is, the advent of Content Delivery Networks 
(CDN) and Cloud Providers made the Internet tangle in a 
scenario where the same server can offer several services and 
web pages based on user geographic location and more 
sophisticated traffic engineering rules. 
CDNs and Cloud Providers are an example of the 
significant change of the Internet in the last decade. The aim 
of this work is to summarize the evolution of the Internet in 
terms of traffic volumes and protocols and to debate on the 
potential ethical and moral issues regarding the use of 
collected network data at ISP level. 
The main contributions of the paper are: 
• Quantification of the changes in protocol usage and 
traffic volumes on Internet in the recent years (Section III).  
 
 Fig. 1: Typical network probe deployment at ISP level 
• Analysis of the personal information carried by 
network packet, separately by ISO/OSI layer, and focusing 
on emerging protocols (Section IV). 
• Description of the ethical issues that arise from 
network monitoring (Section V). 
• Proposal of alternative scenarios that offer a 
reasonable trade-off between users’ privacy and ISPs’ greed 
of pervasive network measurements (Section VI). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II shortly 
overviews the involved stakeholders in the current Internet 
ecosystem. Section III describes the recent evolution of 
Internet traffic. Section IV discusses how personal 
information can be monitored at the ISP level, and section V 
presents the privacy and ethical issues that arise with passive 
network measurement. Section VI defines our alternative 
proposal. Finally, Section VII summarizes our findings. 
 II. INVOLVED STAKEHOLDERS 
The Internet ecosystem is a very tangled and complex 
universe. Since many actors are involved with different 
interests, in this section we provide an in-depth analysis of 
the stakeholders acting in this system. 
The main involved actors are without any doubt the users 
of broadband Internet Access. They are producers of a huge 
amount of information used by third parties, and in some 
cases without awareness. Hence, Internet customers are not 
only clients but also products; their personal information is a 
good normally traded between companies. A proof is the 
widespread phenomenon of Web tracking [5]. As users 
employ an ISP to access services across the Internet, they 
expect the ISP to carry their data without looking inside the 
traffic and respecting their privacy. It is clear that there is a 
trust relationship between them, and an ISP is completely 
aware that lack of trust may bring customers to change 
provider, posing, in some cases, a serious threat of failure or 
bankruptcy for the ISP [6]. In case that a user does not trust 
her provider, she will likely change to another ISP, as 
witnessed by the great effort providers put in clients’ loyalty 
programs. 
On the other hand, Internet Access is just a means for users 
to enjoy services on the Internet. The entities that offer 
services on the Internet are called content providers: social 
networks, e-commerce portals, and search-engines are 
notable examples. 
Few of them hold the majority of clients since the modern 
web is nowadays an oligopoly of few big players [7]. For 
instance, social networks converged around two main 
platforms, namely Facebook and Twitter, while search 
engines are dominated by Google. E-commerce sees a 
handful of major players like Amazon, Ebay, and Alibaba. 
Although the relationship between users and content 
providers is clear and evident to the majority, ISPs and 
content providers are strictly connected by often conflicting 
regulations and directives, e.g., Net neutrality [8] force all 
stakeholders (e.g., ISP, content provider, governments, etc.) 
to treat all data on the Internet in the same way and without 
any discrimination for all users and services. However, a 
crucial voice of cost for an ISP is represented by the traffic 
outgoing from its network and, thus, it wishes to cache as 
much content as possible within its infrastructure (e.g., 
Comcast [9] throttled the data traffic uploaded by peer-to-
peer applications without notifying the users). On the other 
hand, content providers want to have full and exclusive 
visibility on the behavior of their users, e.g., increasing the 
use of HTTPs (encrypted) in place of HTTP. Notice that the 
content of encrypted services cannot be cached using normal 
HTTP caches or proxies, leaving ISPs without a valuable 
means to reduce traffic to the exterior. For example, 
Facebook since April 2013 serves its content via encrypted 
connections: whereas it is a significant improvement from 
the privacy point of view, ISPs were certainly not happy for 
such decision. Also Youtube in January 2014 started to serve 
its content by means of encrypted connections, increasing 
significantly the amount of traffic not cacheable within ISP 
premises (Youtube traffic is more than 25% of total, see Fig. 
4). 
To partly reduce outgoing traffic, the trend shows ISPs 
hosting CDN nodes within their infrastructure. Whereas an 
ISP can benefit from hosting a CDN servers, few 
disadvantages are noticeable: the cache server must be 
powered, and especially must be filled with content coming 
from outside. The ISP has no control on the amount of 
content retrieved and whether only its customers are 
benefiting from that cache. Moreover, CDNs often use 
encryption as default, giving the ISP no visibility on users’ 
behavior. Nevertheless, many works propose collaboration 
between ISPs and CDNs [10], [11]. Therefore, modern 
fashion in content delivering is certainly less appreciated by 
ISPs, since it decreases the amount of visible information at 
network level, but it is the only choice to deal with the big 
players of the Internet. 
The last party involved in this ecosystem are those who 
can benefit from passive network measurements. Several 
actors are interested on information coming from the 
network; for an ISP it is important to know the clients’ 
behavior to properly engineer its infrastructure (e.g., 
knowing which services are important for users allows to  
 Fig. 2: Share of HTTP and HTTPs over last 3 years as 
measured on a PoP aggregating about 10,000 households 
from an European ISP 
better configure the network to carry such traffic). Moreover, 
information about customers’ traffic unveils their interests, 
behavior and personal attitudes. The phenomenon of Web 
tracking is the proof that the brokerage of users’ navigation 
data is widespread. Beside Web trackers, ISPs gather huge 
and complete customers’ navigation data, typical regulatory 
frameworks to protect privacy are often indulgent and not up 
to date.1 
In the next sections we focus our attention on such questions, 
keeping in mind that today’s web is substantially different 
from 10 years ago. Collecting network measurement is 
getting harder due to encryption, Cloud/CDN infrastructure, 
and user’s privacy concern. Nevertheless, what passing on 
the network is still a rich source of information for ISPs, 
researchers, and marketing enterprises. Many companies 
have as core business the collection of personal information 
to sell high detailed customers profile to other companies. 
This kind of business concerns marketing, advertising, 
political, and economy in general, the monetary turnover of 
such marketplace is exponentially increasing in recent years 
as well as users’ awareness of privacy related issues [12]. 
 III. TRAFFIC TREND OVER THE LAST YEARS 
Internet traffic in 2017 is very different from a decade ago. 
Many phenomena changed the ecosystem of the Web, 
causing substantial changes in traffic. The need for privacy 
and security boosted the adoption of encryption, with 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) being the king among secure 
protocols. Moreover, the Web converged around few big 
players, content providers that possess the majority of Web 
services, and can, alone, determine crucial and sudden 
changes on the global Internet traffic. 




Fig. 3: Share of traffic due to the top-N domain names over 
the last three years. Top-{10,20,100} share exhibit an 
increasing trend. 
 
Fig. 4: Share of traffic due to three major Content 
Providers over the last three years 
 
Fig. 2 shows the breakdown of the traffic generated by 
more than 10,000 Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line 
(ADSL) customers over the last 3 years; a passive probe 
monitored all the traffic generated in a PoP of a European 
nationwide ISP, and created flow records using the Tstat 
passive monitoring tool [13]. It provides per-protocol 
breakdown and, in particular, the traffic share for HTTP, 
HTTPs, and other protocols. The portion of encrypted traffic 
raises from 10% in 2013 to 40 % in 2016, unveiling a 4 times 
increment just in 3 years. It is a proof of how the content 
providers and users care about privacy and security. If the 
share for HTTPs increased, HTTP did not considerably 
decrease. The room for HTTPs was made by all other 
protocols (red area in Fig. 2), showing a convergence of the 
Internet traffic on the two aforementioned protocols. 
The Internet was born with a decentralized architecture, 
being a set of interconnected Autonomous Systems. Its 
original aim was to provide a simple means to deploy 
services and disseminate information, with the purpose of 
increasing the number of individuals able to provide their 
own contents to the world. However, in last years, the 
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Internet is witnessing an unprecedented concentration 
around a handful of big players. To quantify this effect, we 
take advantage of Fig. 3, where we report the amount of 
traffic due to the top-N Fully Qualified Domains Names 
(FQDNSs) over the last three years. Each line represents the 
fraction of traffic due to the top-N FQDNs in terms of 
volume over the period of our dataset. We notice that the 
traffic due to the top-{10,20,100} FQDNs increased by more 
of 5% from 2014 to 2017, unveiling a concentration trend of 
the traffic around an always smaller set of Web services. 
To further quantify this trend, we now focus on those 
content providers that offer the most pervasive Web Services 
in terms of users and traffic. To quantify the ascent of such 
giants, we analyze the volume of traffic generated by the 
most prominent ones, and report the results of the 
aforementioned analysis in Fig. 4. Profiting from the dataset 
introduced in the previous paragraph, we tracked the volume 
of traffic to Facebook, YouTube, and NetFlix over the last 3 
years. We chose those three services as they are nowadays 
the leaders in their respective fields, and in terms of 
generated traffic. As depicted by the figure, their volume 
share constantly raised, unveiling the polarization of the 
Internet traffic around few online platforms. In particular, 
YouTube traffic raised from 25% (2014) up to more than 
30% (2017), and NetFlix, available in the monitored country 
since 2015, accounts for more than 5% of volume. 
IV. HOW INTERNET PROTOCOLS BREAK (OR PRESERVE) 
USER’S PRIVACY 
The aim of this section is to analyze how current Internet 
protocols protect user’s privacy, and illustrate which 
information can an eavesdropper extract from passive 
monitoring of traffic. We separately analyze the network 
protocol layers, listing the most used protocols along with a 
discussion about which kind of knowledge can be extracted 
from eavesdropping their headers. In this work, we deal with 
the Internet traffic, so, we skip the discussion about data link 
layer (L2/OSI) issues. Indeed, L2 headers (Ethernet 
typically) are not propagated across routers but their lifespan 
is limited to a LAN. 
A. Network layer 
The Internet Protocol (IP) is the basis of the Internet. 
Among the fields contained in the header, Client and Server 
IP addresses are worthy of note. Client IP address is certainly 
the field carrying more sensible information; in the ISP 
network scenario, it uniquely identifies a particular user’s 
home gateway. Even if home station addresses are often 
dynamic (i.e., managed and possibly changed by the network 
administrator), the association between them and customers 
is certainly retained by the ISP. 
The Server IP address contains the remote endpoint 
contacted, assuming a scenario where the the ADSL  
                                                             
2 https://www.torproject.org/ 
 
Fig. 5: CDF of the traffic related to server IP addresses with 
different numbers of domain names. One day of ISP traffic 
customers are enjoying Web services located remotely on the 
Internet. The ISP can leverage this field to extract knowledge 
about which websites and services are used by a customer, 
and study her behavior. To hide this information, users can 
exploit anonymity network tools, with TOR being the king.2 
Nevertheless, with the advent of CDNs and Cloud Providers, 
the information obtainable by analyzing the server IP 
addresses is getting coarser. Indeed, many services are often 
co-located on the same servers owned by third party IaaS 
companies, with Akamai and Amazon being the leaders. 
Profiting from the dataset used in the previous section, we 
analyze one day of traffic in July 2017, and enumerate the 
domain names associated to each server. We notice that 33% 
of server IP addresses host more than one service – i.e., are 
contacted by monitored clients with more than one name. 
Servers having more than one hostname are responsible for 
a big fraction of the traffic. We quantify this in Fig. 5. For 
each server IP address, we count how many hostnames it 
holds and the number of bytes it handles. We then compute 
the fraction of traffic handled by servers having different 
number of names. Fig. 5 shows the resulting CDF. Less than 
15% of the traffic is directed to servers having one hostname 
only. The picture only slightly changes when aggregating 
hostnames to the second-level – e.g., apis.google.com to 
google.com: only 33% of traffic is due to servers holding one 
second-level domain. That is, the server IP address lets an 
eavesdropper correctly infer the contacted domain name for 
less than 15% of the traffic; this increases up to 33% when 
taking into account only second-level domains. Part of the 
remaining traffic is necessarily misclassified, since many 
domain names (and thus services) run over the same servers. 
Finally, a popular technique used to preserve privacy in 
IP-based network data is IP address anonymization. Several 
algorithms can be exploited to this end, with the most 
popular being Crypto-PAn [14], a cryptography-based 
sanitization tool. However, IP address anonymization still 
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B. Transport layer 
Transport layer builds on two widespread protocols, 
namely TCP and UDP. Their headers contain few fields, and 
poor personal information can be extracted by 
eavesdropping them. In particular, the only interesting fields 
are the port number, as they let a passive monitor to rebuild 
flows, and account each packet to the TCP/UDP connection 
it belongs to. Moreover, the server port number can give a 
hint about the network service contacted, as the list of well-
known ports (0-1023) include popular services such as 
HTTP, TLS, or DNS. 
C. Application Layer 
Dozens of different application layer protocols there 
exists. However, nowadays the Web converged over two 
main protocols, namely HTTP and HTTPS; beside these, 
DNS still has a central role, being necessary to for reaching 
almost any Web server. 
HTTP is the king of Web protocols, and it is used almost 
by all services on the Internet. It does not include encryption 
and, thus, all its headers are transmitted in clear. Therefore, 
all the details of HTTP transactions are offered to passive 
monitoring: an eavesdropper can read the URL and the full 
content of each document; moreover, additional headers 
such as Content-Type and User-Agent can provide 
meaningful information about the users’ setup. Parameters 
of the webpages are transmitted in clear as well, and, thus, 
username and password might be extracted from packets. 
To overcome privacy risks of HTTP, many services rely 
nowadays on HTTPS, that secures the former by putting it 
on the top of TLS. No HTTP header is transmitted in clear, 
leaving a passive monitor without any information about the 
underlying transaction. Nevertheless, TLS includes a field 
called Server Name Indication (SNI), where the client 
indicates in clear the domain name of the server being 
contacted.3 Thus, the hostname of the contacted server is 
exposed to passive monitoring, unveiling in most cases the 
service accessed by the user [17]. Guidelines of TLS version 
1.3 plan to encrypt this field, but this poses several technical 
challenges, as the handshake procedure would result more 
complicated and require additional RTTs before establishing 
the connection.4Moreover, many works showed the power of 
machine learning for extracting knowledge from encrypted 
connections, such as webpage URL [18] and users’ QoE 
[19], [20]. 
The same considerations hold for the DNS protocol, where 
domain names are exchanged in plain text. Even DNSSEC 
does not guarantee confidentiality, but only provides origin 
authentication of the DNS data. DNS traffic can be used to 
provide fine-grained visibility even with encrypted traffic by 
                                                             
3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3546 
4 TLS 1.3 Draft Specifications are available at 
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13spec 
5 QUIC specifications available at https://goo.gl/SBS95v 
rebuilding clients DNS cache and inspecting consequent 
TCP/UDP flows [21], [22]. 
Finally, to overcome the stiffness of TCP and TLS, some 
Content Providers designed and implemented their own 
protocol suites. This is the case of QUIC, designed by 
Google and implemented in Google Chrome, Android 
smartphones as well as on Google Web servers. It relies on 
UDP and provides authentication and confidentiality for 
HTTP transactions. Nevertheless, the server hostname is 
transmitted in clear, posing the same privacy issues of TLS. 
Moreover, QUIC transmits client’s User-Agent in clear, 
unveiling user’s device type. 5 In addition to Google, 
Facebook designed its own application layer protocol, called 
Zero.6 It is based on QUIC’s crypto module, but relies on 
TCP instead of UDP. It is implemented in Facebook and 
Instagram Web servers as well as on the mobile applications 
of such platforms. Being by design similar to QUIC, the 
same considerations hold: the server hostname is exchanged 
in clear, leaking to passive monitors the name of the 
contacted service. 
 V. ETHICAL ISSUES 
Given what has been discussed so far in this work, we can 
identify a set of privacy and ethical issues. In the following, 
we will discuss these issues from two main points of view: 
the user one and the ISP one. 
From the ISP point of view, we can summarize the issue 
with the question: “Is it right to access the data exchanged by 
a user?”. It is not straightforward to give an answer to this 
question: in fact, one could instinctively be tempted to 
respond: 
“no, it is wrong at all” because of the user’s privacy, but there 
are some other aspects that must be considered. In fact, it 
seems obvious that when a user relies on an ISP to access the 
Internet. She should also trust the ISP and assume that her 
data pass through ISP network without any inspection. On 
the other side, if an ISP could inspect user traffic, at least to 
apply some Quality of Service (QoS) policy or just some 
internal routing optimizations, it would be able to improve 
the user network experience. Given that, the ISP could be 
justified to monitor the users’ traffic but where is the 
boundary located and where the ISP should stop in the 
inspection. These questions come out from the fact that the 
current digital world most advantageous activity is 
represented by big data analysis and users profiling [23]. 
Therefore, if an entity can access a huge amount of 
information from a large number of users it might be tempted 
to sell these data to the highest bidder, that is exactly the case 
of an ISP. It seems useful to try to define a limit at which the 
inspection is deep enough for the ISP optimizations and not 
6 https://code.facebook.com/posts/608854979307125/building-
zeroprotocol-for-fast-secure-mobile-connections/ 
too intrusive for users’ privacy and security. It is not evident 
in which way the traffic payload inspection could be 
interesting for routing optimization purposes and then a 
solution could be to force ISPs to inspect only transport 
information (e.g., IP addresses, TCP/UDP ports). 
Nevertheless, TCP and DNS analysis are enough to assess 
websites a client is visiting. The payload inspection, on the 
other hand, could be useful to prevent malicious intents or 
illegal communications. As each ISP provides the network 
access point for its end-users, that are typically a significant 
amount, it could be the best point to detect criminal activity, 
identify involved parties, and prevent them. This fact seems 
to justify a deeper traffic inspection by the ISPs but, in order 
to protect users’ privacy, the inspection activity could be 
delegated to a trusted third party such as police or 
governments institutions7. It is clear how the decision varies 
considering different aspects of the topic and how difficult 
could be to take a decision about it. 
On the other hand, from the end user point of view the 
issue is mainly a matter of privacy and personal information 
disclosure. In this case, we identified one main question: “the 
user’s privacy must be managed only by the user himself?” 
In other words, should the end-user care about his privacy 
while considering all the rest of the world as untrusted or 
there should be some privacy level guaranteed by the ISPs? 
In this case we believe that truth lies somewhere in the 
middle: ISPs should implement their services in order to not 
disclose users’ information and end-users should take care of 
their personal data when sent on the network. Currently, 
personal data protection involves data encryption that is a 
crucial ethical and legal point of discussion. Recent events 
have underlined how encryption can cause problems in case 
of investigation against criminal acts, e.g., phones used by 
terrorists that are totally ciphered and that the authorities 
cannot access (that is what they publicly said) [24]. The 
ethical discussion about data ciphering can be very hard 
because it could be impossible to decide what is right among 
for main possible decisions. 
However, the ethical discussion about encryption is out of 
the scope of this work. We expect a great debate about this 
topic in the near future, where the role of network will take 
second place, as major Content Providers will be involved; 
Whatsapp decision to encipher all messages and hiding them 
from inspection of anyone is a good example and will 
certainly have many consequences [25]. 
For the ISP case, data ciphering is a crucial point: as we 
described in Sec. IV data anonymization could limit the ISP 
information about the user traffic but the sensitive data can 
also be accessed from the payload (which often is not 
obfuscated at all). Then, it is clear that the user has to take 
care of his data by ciphering payload when it is needed for 
privacy means but it is not clear how to address the social 
security problem tied to ciphered data. Moreover, we claim 
                                                             
7 In that case, it should also be discussed the trustworthiness of that entities 
and identified a boundary between public security and a big brother effect. 
that even when having encrypted connections (i.e. HTTPs) 
some information is still assessable (e.g., website history). 
In conclusion, privacy and ethical issues of the ISPs in the 
modern web can be placed in the current digital world ethical 
discussion: it is about finding a trade-off between personal 
privacy a public security. 
 VI. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO 
As presented in the preceding sections, actually users have 
typically a high level of privacy on the payload level, but a 
lower one on the network level. In other words, ISPs can only 
know if, when, and how many times a user have visited a 
particular website, without having access of what activity the 
user have performed on it. How to conciliate the need of 
privacy for the user, with the technical (i.e., QoS) and 
commercial needs for the ISPs. 
A possible solution might be an ecosystem where users 
can voluntarily permit their ISP to access the payload of their 
communications. In exchange the users can enjoy globally a 
better service, thanks to QoS: typically, we have different 
expectations on the waiting time to access a resource, based 
on the type of content we are accessing; for example, waiting 
some (not too much) time to access a textual web page is not 
a big deal, whilst having a video stream that stops constantly 
for buffering can be really annoying. Using QoS, ISPs can 
fine tune the bandwidth given to the users, in function of the 
accessed resources. 
Users may also have economic benefits: they can share the 
revenues that the ISP obtained by selling their data, in terms 
of a reduction of their monthly fee for Internet connection. 
This can be also a big boost in giving access to Internet in 
the growing countries, and for the most disadvantaged 
people in first world countries: lowering the fee for accessing 
Internet, more people can gain access to it, thus giving more 
data to the ISP for them to sell, creating a virtuous cycle. 
However, the depicted alternative poses issues from an 
ethical point of view. In particular, it must be ensured that 
users must not be forced to “sell” their data to the ISPs. The 
risk is that ISP increase the fee to the users that do not want 
to give their data to them, thus making the choice practically 
obligatory for almost everyone. This could be avoided only 
by a strict control of the fees by the government regulatory 
agencies, thus this could be a problem in some countries, 
where this could be seen as an unacceptable intervention of 
the government in the private economy sector or even a 
means for political control. Legislating about Web users’ 
privacy is hard, and might lead to resounding failures, as 
witnessed by the many concerns about 209 European 
ePrivacy Directive [26], [27], [28]. The ISPs can also force 
users to give access to their data by using the QoS, slowing 
Internet access to users not willing to “sell” their data. This 
behavior by ISP, although avoidable from the legal point of 
view (i.e. Service Level Agreement), can be hardly traceable, 
thus creating an “informal” threat to the users’ liberty. 
Concluding, we can say that the alternative scenario 
proposed is feasible, but it should be deployed with great 
attention for the users’ rights, and with great scrutiny 
regarding the ISPs behavior. 
 VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Nowadays, ethical and privacy issues in the networking 
field are getting more important. Internet measurement fields 
raise ethical inquiries when it comes to privacy and security 
concerns of individual users using the Internet. In particular, 
there is a consistent debate about how ISPs should collect 
and treat network measurements. This kind of information 
are fruitful source of knowledge from multiple points of 
view: research, traffic engineering, governmental, and e-
commerce can benefit from measurements retrievable 
through inspection of network traffic. The data collected in 
modern web might carry personal information about the 
users exposed to monitoring, and generates critical ethical 
and moral issues. 
The aim of this work is to shed light on the ethical aspect 
of the information exposed to ISPs in the modern web. We 
highlight ethical issues deriving by the current situation and 
provide general guidelines and best practices to cope with 
the collection of network traffic measurements. 
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